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TO BE OR NOT TO BE?
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURE
OF US LISTED CHINESE COMPANIES
By Judge Fa Chen* & Dr. Lyjun Zhao**
INTRODUCTION
China (Mainland China) has experienced over three decades economic flourish, and
has become the second largest economy. During the period of development, China transplanted
and localized the experience of leading economic forces worldwide. As two significant
economies, the British (hereinafter "the UK") and the American (hereinafter "the US")
commercial practices are similar and converging in many senses, which are both mirrored
greatly by China. However, with regard to takeover regulation, in particular, the application of
takeover defenses, the US and the UK diverge from each other drastically, which empowers the
employment of post-bid anti-takeover tactics to directors and shareholders respectively;
towards pre-bid takeover defenses, especially, the adoption of dual-class share structure
(DCSS), the US and the UK also hold diametrical attitudes. At the crossroad, China chose the
British framework of takeover regulation as its mold, banning the application of DCSS with the
one share, one vote (OSOV) principle clearly written in both its company laws and listing
rules.' This choice may be partly attributed to the fact that when devising the framework of
takeover regulation, China referred the Hong Kong mode greatly, and thus indirectly reflected
the British mode of takeover regulation. More importantly, hostile takeovers were rare in
China, and it did not take hostile takeovers into consideration when making the laws.
The 2008 global financial crisis brought about financial ravage and detrimental
domino effect worldwide. In order to revive the slowing economy through injecting liquidity,
in response, China adopted a number of financial policies, which released abundant capital, and
a great proportion of which flowed into the field of takeover eventually. Consequently, there
are emerging trends that hostile takeovers are booming while corresponding regulations are
incompetent.2 Rather than the lagging regulatory reaction, commercial entities reacted quickly
* Fa Chen, formerly served as Judge - sitting in the Tribunal of Commercial Dispute and Intellectual Property

Infringement - in Chaoyang District Court of Beijing, now as Senior Legal Consultant of a leading law firm.
Specialty: Commercial Dispute Settlement and IP Litigation. Fa Chen conducted research in the UK as a
Chevening Scholar. Email: FaChen@outlook.com
** Dr Lijun Zhao, Lecturer in law, Middlesex University London, Fellow of the Society of Legal Scholars and
the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Research interest: Maritime and Commercial Law.
Email: L.Zhao@mdx.ac.uk
1"Shareholders attend the general meeting of shareholders; one share carries one vote." COMPANIEs LAW OF
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2014 art. 103 [hereinafter (CLOC 2014)]. See also CHINA SEC. REG.
COMMvssioN, Guide to the Articles ofAssociation ofListed Companies 2014, art. 78 "Shareholders conduct their
voting rights according to their shareholding on the one share, one vote basis."
2 This status is clearly reflected by the usage of leverage capital and the ineffectiveness of the tactic
of poison
pills in the ongoing takeover battle between Baoneng and Vanke, which may be the most spotlight-catching
Chinese takeover event. In this takeover battle, the target company named Vanke is a Chinese company listing on
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange which is ranked 1st in the field of real estate worldwide with a net profit of about
USD $ 5 billion in 2015. Before the takeover battle, a state-owned company named Huarun Group was the largest
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to seek safe harbor. Those American stock exchanges became attractive to Chinese companies
due to their tolerance of takeover defenses, in particular, DCSS. To seek the soft regulation with
the issuance of multiple voting shares, dozens of Chinese companies chose the American stock
exchanges as their initial public offering (IPO) venues. Until June 30 2016, there are 150
Mainland Chinese (Chinese) companies listed on the US stock markets, of which
approximately three-tenths employ DCSS. It seems that there is a great desire for DCSS among
Chinese listed companies.
In this paper, the authors aim to discuss the feasibility of adopting DCSS in China in
an empirical perspective. The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows: in Part One, the
authors will search out the financial and regulatory factors, which lead to the emerging hostile
takeover boom in China. Part Two will be an overview of the US listed Chinese companies with
DCSS and other takeover defenses. In Part Three, the authors will analyze the functionality and
corporate performance of the US listed Chinese companies with DCSS. Part Four will analyze
the limitations and restrictions on the application of DCSS on the US stock exchanges and
corresponding implications on the Chinese framework of takeover regulation. Concluding
remarks are the subject of Part Five. As to the range of data to be covered, only those companies
listed after 2011 will be sampled in this paper due to the consideration that some of the data of
the Chinese companies on NYSE or NASDAQ listed prior to 2011, were not available or were
inaccurate; counting them leads to misleading results. Furthermore, the data is dated for such a
changing area of law. In order to reflect the up-to-date status accurately, this paper focuses its
empirical study on data dating back to 2011.
I. The Emerging Trend of Hostile Takeover Boom in China
The Emerging hostile takeover boom in China may be a combined outcome of diverse
causes, and it is extremely difficult to figure out all the financial, regulatory and corporate
factors which may lead to a hostile takeover on a case-by-case basis. However, the recent
amendments of some financial policies and legislation in China have been facilitating hostile
takeovers in the general sense. On the one hand, they enable a bidder to raise leverage capital
more easily to launch a hostile takeover; on the other, they make takeover regulation
increasingly difficult.

shareholder of Vanke with 14.89% of outstanding shares, while the founder Shi Wang held less than 1% of
shareholding. From July 2015, Baoneng began to purchase dispersed shares on the stock exchange and achieved
the shareholding of 5% and 10% on July 11, 2015 and July 25, 2015 respectively. Baoneng succeeded Huarun to
become the largest shareholder on August 26, 2015 with a shareholding of 15.04%, and subsequently improved
this figure to 24.26% on December 11, 2015. From December 18, 2015, Vanke suspended its shares on board of
the stock exchanges. After this suspension was withdrawn on July 4, 2016, Baoneng continued to buy Vanke's
shares and increased its shareholding to about 25.4%. These transactions jointly cost Baoneng over RMB Y 46
billion. However, it is estimated that Baoneng paid just RMB V 10 billion himself, while the other Y36 billion was
either raised through pledging the purchased Vanke's shares to banks or was leveraged from fund companies. On
June 17, 2016, the board of Vanke declared that due to aboard decision which was approved by two-thirds of the
directors, Vanke would issue new shares (poison pills) exclusively to Shenzhen Metro Group (as a white knight)
for buying its assets. Such a resolution was opposed by both Huarun and Baoneng, whose shareholding will be
diluted to 12.10% and 19.27% if the cooperation between Vanke and Shenzhen Metro Group is carried out, while
Shenzhen Metro Group will become the largest shareholder with 20.65% of shareholding. To date, there is no
final outcome of this takeover battle. See Vanke, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2015).
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Raising Takeover Capital is Becoming Easier
Hostile takeovers are commonly launched by a bidder who purchases a great number
of dispersed shares on the stock market at a higher price, and leveraged capital always provides
plenty of funds for such transactions. A number of recently revised financial policies and
legislation in China have released abundant funds, which have been serving as leverage capital
to facilitate hostile takeovers.
Primarily, commercial banks are permitted to use more funds as loans. In order to
revive the slowing economy through injecting liquidity, People's Bank of China (PBOC) has
cut the benchmark interest rate of loan and deposit reserve ratio 3 five times since 2015,
reducing the former from 5.6% to 4.35%4 and the latter from 20% to 17%.' It is estimated that
each 0.5% of deposit reserve equals approximately RMB Y 685 billion,6 thus 3% represents
over RMB Y 4,000 billion. Not only do lower interest rates lessen the loan burden of raising
capital, but also the released funds enable commercial banks to provide more takeover loans.
Moreover, PBOC removed the ceiling for deposit interest rates on October 23, 2015
and permitted commercial banks as well as rural cooperative financial institutions to set this
rate freely. 7 This means that the above-mentioned institutions could price their financial
products to raise deposits; as a result, more raised deposits will flow into the field of takeover
loans eventually.
Furthermore, the detailed implementation of financial policies promoted the hostile
takeover boom as well. In 2015, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) revised
the percentage restriction on loans that commercial banks could provide for takeovers,
increasing the cap from 50% in 2008 to 60% in 2015; in the meantime, the maximum term of
8
takeover loans were prolonged from 5 years to 7 years. Moreover, the scope that such loans
could cover was extended to include all the costs of a takeover. It is broader than the 2008
stipulation which merely comprised transaction fees. 9 In addition, more commercial banks are

See

The

Economic

Times,

Definition

of

"Reserve

Ratio"

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/reserve-ratio (last visited May 18, 2017). Deposit reserve ratio
is a central bank regulation employed by most of the world's central banks, which sets the minimum percentage
of customer deposits that each commercial bank must hold as reserve rather than lend out.
These figures are the benchmark interest rate of one-year's loan. See generally BLACKMERGER,
http://www.blackmerger.com/#!peoples-bank-of-china/cle91 (last visited May 18, 2017).
These figures are the deposit reserve ratio for large financial organisations. See generally Michael Cole, Will
China's latest rate cuts rekindle real estate investment?, MINGTIANDI (Oct. 24, 2015),
http://www.mingtiandi.com/real-estate/china-real-estate-research-policy/will-chinas-latest-rate-cuts-rekindle-th
e-real-estate-industry.
6 See Enda Curran & Kevin Hamlin, China Cuts Banks' Reserve Requirement Ratio,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29,
2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-29/china-cuts-reserve-ratio-in-latest-step-tosupport-growth.
7 See Chen Jia, Economists: Interest reforms let market decide, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE STATE
COUNCIL (Oct. 26, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/policies/policy watch/2015/10/26/
content 281475220321273.htm.
' See Guideline 2008, art. 18. "Takeover loan should not provide more than 50% of the total takeover capital.
Guideline 2008, art. 19. "The term of takeover loan should be no longer than 5 years in general. Such stipulations
expired and were substituted by Guideline 2015, art. 21." "Takeover loan should not provide more than 60% of
the total takeover capital." Guideline 2015, art. 22. "The term of takeover loan should be no longer than 7 years in
general."
9 See Guideline 2008, art 4. "Takeover loan means the loan that commercial bank provides to a bidder or his
subsidiary for paying the cost of takeover transaction." See Guideline 2015, art. 4. "Takeover loan means the loan
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permitted to conduct their business in the area of takeover loans due to the lowered threshold.'o
This means that when looking for takeover capital, a bidder has more options than ever before.
Even though the above-discussed financial policies and legislation were revised with
the purpose of encouraging investments rather than facilitating hostile takeovers, the higher
percentage of loans, less interest burden, longer loan term and more choices jointly result in a
financial scheme that makes it easier for a bidder to raise leverage capital. Correspondingly, the
threshold of launching a hostile takeover is lowering in China.
Takeover Regulation is Becoming More Difficult
The incompetence of Chinese takeover regulation, in particular, the poor
identification of persons acting in concert contributes to the boom of hostile takeover as well.
The recently established financial policy, i.e. the Pilot Program of an Interconnection
Mechanism for Transactions on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Markets, made this
weakness even worse."
Under the takeover regulatory framework in China, where a bidder individually or
collectively holds 5% or above of the total outstanding shares of a target company, they should,
within three days of this occurrence, submit a written report to both CSRC and the stock
exchange on which the target company is listed, notify the target company and make a public
announcement about their shareholding. Within this three day term, the bidder and persons
12
acting in concert with him are prohibited from buying or selling shares of the target company.
Moreover, after obtaining 5% or more of shareholding, the bidder and persons acting in concert
shall obey an obligation of disclosure each time when their shareholding of the target company
increases or declines 5%. " Such stipulations are promulgated on the grounds that takeovers
should be conducted under supervision and regulation. Furthermore, compulsory disclosure
could attract other investors to purchase the shares of the target company, and thus it could
enhance share price to increase takeover cost.1 4 Moreover, such requirements enable a target
company to realize the shareholding of a bidder in a timely manner and to decide whether and
how to take defenses.
It is relatively easy for CSRC to monitor and regulate a takeover launched by a single
bidder. However, where a takeover is initiated by persons acting in concert, in particular, a
hostile takeover of which the bidders do not wish to disclose their takeover collusion; it is
sometimes complicated to identify these persons acting in concert. To solve this problem,
CSRC lists 11 specific circumstances and an open-ended provision with regard to the
presumption of persons acting in concert, which mainly concentrate on relative relationship,

that commercial bank provides to a bidder or his subsidiary for paying the cost of takeover transaction and other
fees generated during the takeover."
"o Guideline 2015 cancelled two requirements that existed in Guideline 2008 on the commercial banks which are
permitted to provide takeover loan, as follow: 10% or above of Capital Adequacy Ratio and 1% or above of
Reserve Balance.
" Moreover, the replica of this Pilot Program, i.e. the Shenzhen - Hong Kong stock connect program has been
approved by the State Council, and is proposed to carry out on December 5, 2016.
" Securities Law of People's Republic of China, GENERAL PROVISIONS, art. 86, 2014. The same statement is
also stipulated in CSRC, Measures for Regulating Takeover of Listed Companies 2014, Article 13 (1)
[hereinafter (Measures2014)].
13 Measures 2014, art. 13.
14 Wei Cai, Hostile Takeover and Takeover Defences in China, 42 HONG KONG L. J. 901, 933.
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cross-shareholding and cross-employment. 15 Nonetheless, such stipulations are far from
enough, since it is sometimes hard to verify persons acting in concert when they do not disclose
their relationship actively.
The Pilot Program of an Interconnection Mechanism for Transactions on the
Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Markets, which was enacted on October 17, 2014, may
aggravate the difficulty of takeover regulation even further. In the light of this Program,
investors in China could purchase shares of some specific listed companies on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange via the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and vice versa. It means that where a
person wishes to launch a hostile takeover and to veil the obligation of disclosure, not only
could he seek potential persons acting in concert in China, but also he could look for alliances
in Hong Kong so that his confederates could purchase shares of the target company via the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange to conceal this takeover collusion. Although CSRC and the Hong
Kong Securities Regulation Commission endorsed a memorandum and declared that they
would conduct effective takeover regulation together, no framework of the identification of
persons acting in concert has been established yet. As a result, it will be more difficult for
CSRC to conduct takeover regulation, as well as for a target company to adopt post-bid
defenses properly since they do not know the actual shareholding of a bidder.
Hostile takeovers are flourishing while official regulation does not keep the pace. On
these grounds, permitting companies to adopt more takeover defenses autonomously is a
feasible solution to this dilemma. Under the present circumstance of DCSS being banned in
China, many Chinese companies went public in the US to issue multiple voting shares.

15

Measures2014, art. 83: Where there is no proof to the contrary, investors who take over a listed company will

be presumed as persons acting in concert when any of the following circumstances is achieved: (a) one or more

investors have controlling interests over the other investors; (b) the investors are controlled by the same person;
(c) the chief members of directors, supervisors and executives of one investor serve as the directors, supervisors
and executives of another investor simultaneously; (d) one investor holds shares of another investor, and could

influence his major decisions; (e) any legal person, institution or natural person provides financing arrangement
for the investors with regard to a takeover; (t) partnership, cooperation, joint venture or any other economic

relationship exists among the investors; (g) an investor and a natural person who owns 30% or more shares of this
investor hold shares of the same listed company; (h) an investor and his directors, supervisors or executives hold
shares of the same listed company; (i) a natural person who owns 30% or more shares of one investor and any of
the persons (comprising but not limiting to directors, supervisors, executives and their parents, spouses, offspring
as well as their offspring's spouses, parents and siblings of their offspring's spouses, etc.) collectively with this
investor hold shares of the same listed company; () directors, supervisors, executives of a listed company and
those relatives stated in (i) hold shares of their company simultaneously or indirectly hold shares of their
company simultaneously through undertakings controlled by them or their relatives; (k) directors, supervisors,
executives and staff hold shares of their company with legal persons or other institutions they control or entrust;
(1) other connections exist among the investors.
6

See

REUTERS

NEWS, Update China to allow cross-border investment between Hong Kong Shanghai stock

markets (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/china-crossborderidUSL3NON21MY20140410.
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H. An Overview of the US Listed Chinese Companies with Dual-class Share Structure
and Other Takeover Defenses
The US Listed Chinese Companies with Dual-class Share Structure
Currently, there are 150 Chinese companies " listed on the American stock
exchanges, including 63 companies on NYSE, 85 companies on NASDAQ and 2 companies on
AMEX. Of the 150 companies, 45 were listed after 2011; one corporation named Wins Finance
Holdings Inc. (symbol: WINS), which was listed on NASDAQ in 2015, should be excluded
from the sample since it achieved US listing via the merger with a shell company rather than
IPO. " Therefore, the sampled subject to be analyzed in this part is 44 companies, which were
listed on the American stock exchanges from January 1, 2011 to June 30, 2016.
Among these 44 companies, 24 issued dual-class shares during their IPOs, 19
including 13 on NYSE while the other 11 on NASDAQ.20 Furthermore, one company, Xunlei
Limited (symbol: XNET), proposed to adopt DCSS according to its prospectus but eventually
21
employed the OSOV principle during its IPO in 2014. Moreover, two companies used DCSS,
22
but had been delisted.
It seems that DCSS and the OSOV principle enjoy a similar popularity since the
number of the US listed Chinese companies with DCSS prevails over their counterparts with
single-class share structure (SCSS) slightly. However, compared with the UK contemporarily,
of which only 3 out of the 29 US listed British companies issued multiple voting shares,23
DCSS seems to be more attractive to the US listed Chinese companies (see Figure 1).

" Companies headquartered in China that raised capital through issuing ordinary shares (or depositary receipts
over ordinary shares) by primary listing on the American stock exchanges are counted. Companies which are also
listed in Hong Kong or China are not included as well as those that were delisted or suspended as of June 30,
2016. This criterion is applicable afterwards unless specified. See generally NASDAQ.com.
1 See generally Wins Finance Holdings Inc. Prospectuses, communications, business combinations,
http://winsholdings.com.
1

See

generally SEC,

Company Filings, Prospectuses & Annual

Reports (June

30,

2016),

https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
20 See infra Appendix I. Detailed information of the 24 US listed Chinese companies with DCSS.
21 According to Xunlei Ltd's initial prospectuses as of June 8, 2011, its shares would be divided into Class A
shares with one vote per share and Class B shares with ten votes per share. However, pursuant to its revised
edition of prospectuses as of June 12, 2014, Xunlei Ltd chose one share, one vote framework eventually. See
Company Filings, Prospectuses& Annual Report, supra note 19.

The two companies are Sungy Mobile (symbol: GOMO) and Youku Tudou (symbol: YOKU), which were
listed on NASDAQ in 2013 and NYSE in 2012 respectively. GOMO was delisted in 2015 due to the
going-private transaction between the major shareholders and small shareholders; while YOKU was delisted in
2016 on the basis of the acquisition by BABA. These two companies are not counted into the 24 companies with
DCSS.
22

23 See NASDAQ.com. See also Company Filings, Prospectuses& Annual Report, supra note 19.
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Other Takeover Defenses in Use by the US Listed Chinese Companies
In addition to DCSS, these US listed Chinese companies also adopt other takeover
defensive measures. In this part, these takeover defenses in use will be analyzed.
ConditionalDual-class Share Structure and the Variant ofDual-class Share Structure
One apparent characteristic of DCSS lies in the fact that two classes of shares carry
differentiated voting rights. In this strict sense, the company named Autohome Inc. (symbol:
ATHM) does not employ DCSS since both its Class A shares and Class B shares are entitled
one vote per share. 27 However, its articles of association reverse this status.
According to these articles, where the shareholding of the controlling shareholder
falls below 51% but remains above 39.3% regardless of the specific percentage, the Class B
shares held by the shareholder as a whole would carry a fixed voting power of 51 %.28 In other
words, less than 51% of shareholding represented by Class B shares could carry 51% of voting
rights under special conditions.
Furthermore, these articles of association state that where the controller's
shareholding is above 39.3%, they are entitled to appoint at least a majority of the directors on
the board, as well as, fill the vacancy in case a director he nominated is removed. Moreover, the
directors appointed by the controller are not obliged to retire by rotation. 2 9 These articles
jointly result in the effect that special control power is directly entitled to the particular person
who holds Class B shares. It is hard to say there is any substantial difference between this
mechanism and the rationale of DCSS which indirectly grants the specific person the right to
control through weighting his voting power. On this basis, ATHM employs a conditional
DCSS. 3 0
The pattern of LightIn The Box Co Ltd. (symbol: LITB) is special as well. LITB
issues a single class of shares, of which the mode conforms to the OSOV principle at the
general meeting of shareholders under most circumstances. However, in case it relates to a
change of control of the company, the shares held by the founders are entitled three votes per
share. 31 This means that the founders' shares would be converted into multiple voting shares

See Autohome Inc., Articles of Association (Nov. 27, 2013).
Id. "If the number of Telstra's shares represents more than or equal to fifty-one percent (51%) of the total
issued and outstanding shares, then each Class B ordinary share shall carry the right to one vote. If Telstra's
shares represent less than fifty-one percent (51%) but more than or equal to thirty-nine and three-tenths percent
(39.3%) of the total issued and outstanding shares, then each Class B ordinary share shall carry such number of
votes that would result in Telstra's shares carrying, in the aggregate fifty-one percent (51%) of the total voting
rights in the company."
29 Id "...so long as the Telstra shareholders in the aggregate hold at least fifty-one percent (51%) of voting rights
represented by the issued and outstanding voting shares in the company, the Telstra shareholders shall be entitled,
but not obligated, to appoint at least a majority of the directors and remove and replace any director so appointed,
in each case by depositing a notification of appointment or removal at the registered office of the company...a
Telstra director shall not be subject to retirement by rotation and should not be taken into account in determining
the number of directors who are to retire by rotation so long as the Telstra shareholders in the aggregate hold at
least fifty-one percent (51%) of voting rights represented by the issued and outstanding voting shares in the
company."
30 Autohome, Inc. is calculated into the 24 US listed Chinese companies with DCSS.
31 See LightIn The Box Co Ltd., Articles of Association, (May 23, 2013). "Each holder
of our ordinary shares is
entitled to one vote per share. However, in matters related to change of control, certain founding shareholders will
be entitled to three votes per share."
27
28
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under such special circumstances. Nevertheless, it is proper to regard this mode as a variant of
DCSS rather than a conditional DCSS as there is a single class of shares after all.32
Staggered Board
Another takeover defense commonly used by the US listed Chinese companies is
33
staggered board. From 2011, five out of the forty-four US listed Chinese companieS have
applied such defenses in their articles of associations, taking up a percentage of over 10%; and
all these five companies were listed on NASDAQ in 2015. Moreover, one company, Acorn
International Inc. (symbol: ATV), proposed to adopt a staggered board according to its
prospectus but employed a single class of directors eventually. Furthermore, none of the US
listed Chinese companies adopt DCSS and staggered boards simultaneously, although they do
not conflict.
Take Pacific Special Acquisition Corp. (symbol: PAAC) as a representative to reveal
the functionality of staggered board, PAAC divides its five directors into two classes with three
directors in Class A and two directors in Class B. Where the directors of Class A face
replacement and election at the general meeting of shareholders in 2016, Class B directors can
stay on the board until the following general meeting of shareholders in 2017. In 2017, Class B
directors will be re-elected wholly while Class A directors stay unchanged until the 2018
annual general meeting of shareholders. In other words, Class A and Class B retire alternatively
by rotation rather than simultaneously. Correspondingly, the term of office is two years. It
should be noted that where there are three classes of directors, the term of office would be three
years as employed by the other four companies with staggered board structures. It means that
under this mode the amount of classes equals the directors' term of office. Special attention
should be paid to the stipulation of Wowo Ltd (symbol: JMU), which sets a sunset clause of the
34
rotational election of different classes. Pursuant to its articles of association, after each class
of the directors experiencing election, the method of rotational election will expire. Instead, one
third of the directors (or, if their number is not a multiple of three, the number nearest to but not
greater than one third) will retire from office and stand for election at annual general meeting of
shareholders. It means that an unfixed scope of directors will retire annually regardless of
which class they are from; and accordingly, the term of office is not fixed.
The mechanism of staggered board could make a target company less attractive rather
than frustrating a hostile takeover fundamentally. It accounts for the fact that although over
one tenth of the forty-four US listed Chinese companies adopt this defense, these five
companies 3 5 jointly took up 0.26% of the total market capitalization of the forty-four Chinese
companies; and thus it is not a leading takeover defense.
Exclusive Directors Nomination Right - Alibaba Partnership
BABA employs a unique mode of takeover defense among the forty-four companies,
namely, Alibaba Partnership. 36 Pursuant to its articles of association, BABA applies a
32

LITB is not counted into the 24 US listed Chinese companies with DCSS.

See infra Appendix III.
See Wowo Ltd, Articles of Association, (Jan. 9, 2015).
See generally
3s The combined market capitalisation of the 5 companies was USD $727,000,000.
NASDAQ.com.
36 All of the stipulations relating to BABA discussed in Part 2.23. See Alibaba Partnership, Annual Report (Form
10-K) (May 24, 2016).
33
3
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mechanism of partnership, which consists of thirty-four partners who conduct their rights on
the one partner, one vote basis. This partnership enjoys two special rights: one is the exclusive
right to nominate directors, while the other relates to the allocation of bonus.
According to the articles, even though the director nominees should be appointed at
the general meeting of shareholders, in case these nominees are denied by the general meeting
of shareholders or leave the board after election regardless of the reason, Alibaba Partnership
enjoys the right to appoint an interim director who serves until the following annual general
meeting of shareholders. There is no limitation of such an appointment in terms of frequency,
which means that as long as the nominees chosen by Alibaba Partnership are not elected by the
general meeting of shareholders, this Partnership could appoint interim directors constantly.
Such a stipulation results in an effect that Alibaba Partnership has the actual power to nominate
directors, even though in the name of nominees or interim directors. Furthermore, pursuant to
the articles, whenever the directors nominated (including the interim directors appointed) by
Alibaba Partnership take up less than a majority of the total directors on board, Alibaba
Partnership is empowered to appoint additional directors to the board at its sole discretion
without any additional shareholder approval to ensure that the directors nominated or appointed
by Alibaba Partnership could comprise a simple majority of the board. According to BABA's
latest annual report, there are eleven directors on the board currently, of which five are Alibaba
Partnership nominees. Consequently, this Partnership is entitled to appoint two additional
directors to increase its nominees to seven, occupying a simple majority of the thirteen directors
in total.
Alibaba Partnership also determines the allocation of corporate bonus. The allocation
of bonus, primafacie, is decided by the compensation committee according to its articles of
association. However, the compensation committee is established by the board of directors.
Since Alibaba Partnership controls at least a simple majority of the directors as discussed
above, it determines the defacto allocation of bonus.
Several other stipulations in the articles of association make Alibaba Partnership
unbreakable. Firstly, the election of partners is the own business of this Partnership. The
number of partners is dynamic and new partners are elected annually. The election of new
partners requires the approval of at least 75% of all the partners without the participation of
shareholders. Secondly, Alibaba Partnership's nomination rights and related provisions of the
articles of association cannot be changed unless upon 95% of voting rights. Due to the
agreement between Alibaba Partnership and the largest two shareholders of BABA named
Softbank and Yahoo which hold 32% and 15.4% of shares respectively, as well as the fact
that the co-founders Jack Ma and Joseph C. Tsai jointly hold 11% of the total shares, it is
impossible for outsiders to collect 95% of voting rights to abolish this Partnership per se as well
as its exclusive directors nomination right. Lastly, there is a bottom clause that where any
change of control, merger or sale of BABA, Alibaba Partnership should not be transferred or
otherwise delegated or given a proxy to any third-party with respect to the right to nominate
directors.

See id. The agreement is written as follows: "Softbank will vote its shares in favor of the nominees of Alibaba
Partnership to be directors at each general meeting of shareholder as long as its shareholding is above 15% in
exchange for the right to nominate one director of its own, who will be supported fully by Jack Ma and Joseph C.
TSAI. Yahoo will conduct its voting rights to support the nominees of Alibaba Partnership to be directors at the
general meeting of shareholder in exchange for its cooperation with BABA in the field of intellectual property."
"
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Figure 9: The Insiders' Shareholding and Voting Power of the 22 Companies with
Dual-Class Share Structure
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The 44 US listed Chinese companies have different corporate performance in terms of
share price.4 5 With regard to the 24 companies with DCSS in the strict sense, 11 out of the 24
companies experienced an underperformance with the last sale below IPO price, while the other
13 were opposite. In respect of the 13 companies employing the OSOV principle without
takeover defenses, 10 had the last sale lower than IPO price, while such poor performance was
displayed by one of the 5 companies employing the OSOV principle with staggered board.
Moreover, BABA's share price succeeded its IPO price while for LITB it did not (see Figure
10).

" See infra Appendix I for detailed data of IPO price and last sale.
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The Applicable Mode of Dual-class Share Structure in China
The Scope ofApplication
Figure 3 reveals that 15 out of the 24 US listed Chinese companies with DCSS
employ corporate businesses under the industry classification of either Computer & Software
or General Retailers, jointly taking up 62.5%. In this sense, it seems plausible to restrict the
application of DCSS to specific industries, i.e. Computer & Software and General Retailers, as
they are leading forces in terms of numbers. However, in consideration of IPO raised funds and
market capitalization, these 15 companies account for 52.2% and 55.2% of the 24 companies
separately, 4 6 which are both lower than that percentage counted by number. Moreover, 8 out of
47
the 15 companies had outperformance in terms of share price, taking up a percentage of
53.3%. However, when calculating the 24 companies as a whole, 13 companies of which have a
last sale above the IPO price with a percentage of 54.2%.48 This means that these companies
involving Computer & Software or General Retailers did not achieve better corporate
performance than the average level. Therefore, it is not convincing to permit merely companies
involving Computer & Software or General Retailers to employ DCSS. Furthermore, such a
restriction may result in the problem of categorization, i.e. how to sort companies in the light of
industry classification 4 9 . On these grounds, industry classification could not be a feasible
restriction on the application of DCSS.
Furthermore, NYSE and NASDAQ only permit new applicants to list with the
issuance of dual-class shares, which means that existing listed companies are prohibited from
converting into this share structure.so These stipulations are written under the consideration
that during the IPO stage of a company, there are no public investors whose rights will be
reduced by the issuance of multiple voting shares. The investors join a company via
subscription, and it is their own choice, with full knowledge, to conduct the investment of
purchasing shares with inferior voting rights. However, if after listing, an existing listed
company could improve the voting power of specific persons through converting their single
voting shares into multiple voting shares, it is extremely unfair to the other shareholders whose
voting power will be reduced substantially. Therefore, where DCSS is adopted in China, the
existing listed companies should be excluded from the application in order to treat the interests
of all shareholders equally.
It should be noted that the existing listed companies may try to circumvent this
limitation discussed above. The circumvention may be carried out through setting up a new
company and listing it with DCSS, then merging the present company into the new company;
or even through delisting the present company via going-private transactions and to relist it

* See infra Appendix I.
4 See infra Appendix I.
48 See infra Appendix
I.
Concept Paper, Weighted Voting Rights, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. (Aug. 2014), at 49
4
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082.pdf.
0 It should be highlighted that VIPS initially issued a single class of shares at its IPO stage on NYSE in 2012, but
it conducted recapitalisation to transfer to DCSS in 2014. See VIPS, Report of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K)
(Sept. 16, 2014). Such practice seems to be inexplicable since it is expressly contrary to the NYSE listing rules.
The only possible explanation is that NYSE sometimes permits listed companies to break through the restrictions
stipulated in its listing rules just as the fact that Ford employed DCSS in the 1950s during its IPO stage on NYSE
even though the OSOV restriction was clearly in use.
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afterwards with DCSS.51 Thus, CSRC should make strict regulation to prevent circumvention
risks from occurring since it is responsible for checking and ratifying the listing of companies
in China.
The Maximum Votes and the Unit of Shares
Figure 7 shows that 16 out of the 24 US listed Chinese companies with DCSS entitle
10 votes to each of their Class B shares, including 9 out of 11 listed on NYSE and 7 out of 13
listed on NASDAQ. In this sense, the ratio of one to ten is a leading mode. Moreover, the
ceiling of 10 votes has jurisdictional supports. The restriction of maximum votes is clearly
written in Swedish law,5 2 while Japan employs a mode of the unit stock system, which entitles
one unit to be formed by either 100 Class A shares or 10 Class B shares," results in an actual
outcome of the ratio are one to ten. Even though there is no theoretical footing regarding the
maximum votes each multiple voting share could carry, a ceiling of 10 votes may be an
appropriate choice for China since it could avoid over-diverse application of DCSS.
Rather than directly issuing dual-class shares with different voting rights, the
Japanese stock unit mode could be transplanted by China to employ DCSS without annulling
the present OSOV doctrine. In the light of the Chinese stock market, a stock transaction is
conducted in terms of round lot, where one round lot comprises of 100 shares. Therefore, the
Chinese mode could be designed as follows: voting power is conducted via stock units on the
one unit, one vote basis. One stock unit could be made up of either 10 Class B shares or between
20 and 100 Class A shares in multiples of ten. Fractional stock unit is not counted in terms of
voting rights but enjoys corporate dividends.
Internal Balancing and Legal Remedies
In case of the application of DCSS, the voting power of a company would be
concentrated, which means that the election of directors is mainly decided by controllers.
Under such a circumstance, how to avoid management entrenchment is the core issue to be
solved, and internal balancing as well as legal remedies may be feasible solutions. With regard
to legal remedies, it should be noted that relevant provisions similar to the US-based class
action and derivative action have already been stipulated in China's company law; 5 4 therefore,
the focus of this part is the establishment of internal balancing.

st Weighted Voting Rights, supra note 49, at ¶ 151.
52 Aktiebolagslagen [Companies Act], ch. 4 § 5 [SFS] 2005:552 (Swed.). "No share could carry voting rights
which are more than ten times greater than the voting rights of any other share."
s3 Japan created a unit stock system in 2011 to reconcile the clash between the legislative OSOV principle and
DCSS. In the light of the unit stock system, although per Class A share and per Class B share is equivalent in
terms of voting right and dividend, they contribute different fractions to one stock unit. For example, according to
the articles of association of Cyberdyne, one stock unit could be made up of 100 Class A shares or 10 Class B
shares. Since each stock unit carries one vote regardless of its component, such system results in an outcome that
when shareholders own the same amount of shares, a Class B shareholder is entitled to ten times as many voting
rights as a shareholder with Class A shares actually. See Koji Toshima, Cyberdyne's dual-class IPO, 33 INT'L
FiN. L. REv. 43 (2014-2015).
s4 CLOC 2014, art. 151. "Where the directors or senior executives violate the fiduciary duty, any shareholder
individually or shareholders collectively as a group own over 1% of shareholding for consecutive 180 days could
request the board of supervisors to launch a lawsuit in written from.. In case this request is rejected by the board
of supervisors or is not implemented within thirty days or is initiated under emergency so that any delay may
result in irreparable corporate loss, the aforesaid shareholders could launch a lawsuit directly in their own names
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The employment of independent directors is a solution to managerial misconducts,
and may be applicable to companies with DCSS.ss Independent directors of listed companies
with DCSS should be elected and appointed at the general meeting of shareholders. However, a
restriction should be set that only Class A shareholders are entitled to elect independent
directors, who may serve as the representatives of Class A shareholders to voice their opinions
at board meetings. Furthermore, there should be a minimum percentage of independent
shareholders occupy the board. More importantly, whenever a transaction is conducted
between a company and its shareholders who nominated directors, these directors should be
excluded from voting in order to safeguard the interests of the other shareholders and the
company.
6
It is generally accepted that control per se is valuable,1 and this value is estimated to
7
be an average 14% of the stock value according to a statistical analysis.s Compared with a
company with the OSOV principle, an insider of a company with DCSS could get the same
level of control via smaller equity. Therefore, where all the other factors are excluded, superior
voting shares are more valuable than inferior voting shares. Consequently, it is a universal
practice that inferior voting shares of companies with DCSS are traded at a lower price than
single-class shares.s"
Currently, the 24 US listed Chinese companies employ a common model that each
outstanding share enjoys equal dividend as well as the same issuing price regardless of the
voting power it carries. In other words, the only difference between superior voting share and
inferior voting share is voting power. Such a mode is relatively unacceptable in China which
emphasizes visible justice. Instead, a mode of either entitling different classes of shares with
equal dividends but issuing inferior voting shares at a discounted IPO price or issuing all shares
at equal IPO price, however, empowering inferior voting shares with higher dividends is more
practical in China. Such a design could be supported by the practice in the US. According to an
empirical analysis that sampled 70 American listed companies with DCSS during 1962-1986,
46 companies entitled superior dividends to their inferior voting shares, and another 2

for the sake of the company." See CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2013, art. 52.
"Where different lawsuits relate to the same object of action, the court could integrate these lawsuits into one
class action, and the outcome is binding to all the plaintiffs if they approve the integration in advance no matter

&

they attend the trial or not."
s Similar restrictions have already been in use in the US that some listed companies employed a mode of
entitling Class A shareholders and Class B shareholders to nominate their directors respectively, and the
percentage of shareholders that each class of shareholders could nominate was set in the articles of associations in
advance. See Marcia Millon Cornett & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Voting rights and shareholder wealth the
issuance of limited voting common stock, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 178 (1989). See also M.
Megan Partch, The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth, 18 J. FIN. ECON.
313, 318-319 (1987); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-ClassFirms in the UnitedStates, 23 R. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1057 (2010).
56 Weighted Voting Rights, supra note 49, at ¶ 11. See also Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, The One Share - One
Vote Debate:A TheoreticalPerspective (ECGI - Finance, Working Paper No. 176/2007).
5 Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, PrivateBenefits of Control:An InternationalComparison, 59 J. FIN. 573,
573 (2004).
8 An empirical analysis showed that outstanding shares of dual-class shares companies were priced at a discount
of about 18% than their counterparts with single-class shares. See Scott B. Smart, Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai
Chad J. Zutter, What's in a Vote? The Short- and Long-run Impact ofDual-ClassEquity on IPOFirm Values, 45
J. ACCT. & EcoN. 94, 100 (2008).
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companies set a sunset clause with regard to the preferential dividends that inferior voting
shares enjoyed."
Furthermore, in consideration of the Chinese stipulation that 'shares could be issued
with a price equal to or over their par value, but not below their par value', where Class B
shares are issued at par value, it would leave no space for Class A shares to be issued at a
discounted price. Therefore, the latter mode, i.e. Class A shares are issued at IPO price equal to
Class B shares but enjoy higher dividends, is more feasible.
The Limitations of Application
DCSS is commonly employed by the US listed Chinese companies with some
restrictions on the rights enjoyed by the holders of weighted voting shares. In this part, these
restrictions will be reviewed to discuss their implications. Some typical restrictions adopted by
American companies with DCSS will also be discussed to enrich comparative analysis.6 1
The most common limitation on the application of DCSS is the restriction on the
transfer of multiple voting shares to outsiders. It means that once multiple voting shares are
assigned to a person who is not a member of the initial beneficial owners or their affiliated
entities, those assigned multiple voting shares must be converted into OSOV shares
immediately. All the 24 US listed Chinese companies employ such a restriction, while it is also
commonly applied by American companies, e.g. Alphabet (formerly Google), Facebook Inc.
and Linkedln. In consideration of the purpose of adopting DCSS in China, i.e. keeping specific
persons on board to maintain their control, it is reasonable to employ a similar restriction on the
transfer of Class B shares since the aforesaid purpose will become meaningless without such
restriction.
One company (ATHM) requires that in case a change of control event takes place, all
its Class B multiple voting shares must be converted into Class A shares without delay. Such a
restriction is not found among American companies. In addition, one company (JD) requires
that where its founder Richard Liu could not serve as the CEO or attend board meetings any
longer due to any physical or mental condition, the conversion of all JD's multiple voting
shares into the same amount of Class A shares will be triggered. Similar restrictions are also
adopted by American companies, e.g. Alphabet, LinkedIn, Groupon, etc. Even though these
two sorts of restrictions are not leading modes by number, they are in consistent with the
purpose of keeping specific persons as controllers; therefore, these two restrictions could be
transplanted into the Chinese framework.
One company (EHIC) sets a minimum threshold with regard to the issuance of its
multiple voting shares, i.e., Class B shares must take up no less than 5% of the total outstanding
shares. It means that provided its Class B shares as a whole fall below 5% of the total
outstanding shares, all these Class B shares must be converted into Class A shares. LinkedIn
sets a similar restriction with a threshold of 10%. Considering the fact that the Class B shares of
both EHIC and Linkedln carry 10 votes per share, the threshold of 5% means the insiders could
" See Cornett & Vetsuypens, supra note 55, at 178. Also in the practice in the US, inferior voting shareholders
were generally entitled preferential dividend (often 10%) in order to smooth the recapitalization of DCSS. See
Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Dual-ClassRecapitalizationsas Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent
Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 129, 136 (1988). See also Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 55, at 1057.
60 CLOC 2014, art. 127.
61

See infra Appendix IV for a detailed summary of the restrictions. All the restrictions discussed in this part are

from the articles of associations of these companies filed on SEC.

235

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

21

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

control approximately 34.5% of voting rights; while this maximum voting power is 52.6% if
the threshold is 10%.62 Therefore, the threshold of 10% could guarantee a simple majority of
voting power while the threshold of 5% could not achieve this goal. Even though 34.5% of
voting power is significant enough to decide most corporate affairs, in consideration of the
purpose of adopting DCSS, the threshold of 10% is more reasonable.
Another common restriction adopted by these US listed Chinese companies is the
requirement of minimum equity held by insiders. Indeed, 11 out of the 24 companies with
DCSS adopt such a restriction though with different percentages (see Appendix IV). In view of
the purpose that multiple voting shares should be held by insiders or their affiliated entities
exclusively, this requirement is meaningless in China.
There are some restrictions applied by American companies but are not employed by
their Chinese counterparts. Two American companies, Facebook and Groupon adopt a
mechanism of voting to exit, which requires that in case sufficient multiple voting shares
holders approve the transfer to SCSS, the conversion of all multiple voting shares into single
voting shares will take place. Facebook sets its requirement at 50%, while Groupon employs a
threshold of 66.6%. In addition, Groupon establishes a sunset clause in its sixth amended
certificate of incorporation, which requires all its multiple voting shares to be converted into
single voting shares mandatorily in five years. No similar restrictions are employed by the 24
US listed Chinese companies.
The system of voting to exit is the autonomy of corporation in nature. Nevertheless,
such autonomy relates to the recapitalization of a company, and thus it is regarded as a
significant corporate affair that requires two-thirds special majority of votes held by the
shareholders at the general meeting in China. Therefore, it is practical to localize the
mechanism of voting to exit via conferring such power to the general meeting of shareholders
with a criterion of two-thirds approval.
In respect of the sunset clause, it may be more reasonable not to adopt such a
mandatory expiration because there is no practice relating to the application of DCSS in China,
and thus the actual outcome of such an application is hard to predict. In case the application is
practically beneficial, it is not appropriate to limit it within a fixed duration. On the contrary, if
the application of DCSS is problematic, it is proper to abolish it timely rather than after 5 years'
adoption. On these grounds, an elastic lifespan of the application of DCSS is more feasible in
China. It means that there is no sunset clause; instead, CSRC is responsible for conducting the
periodical evaluation of the application of DCSS, e.g. every two years. In case the outcome of
evaluation is positive, a company is permitted to prolong the application for another two years;
otherwise, a negative outcome means a company must transfer to SCSS.
Based on the discussions above, the framework of limited application of DCSS as a
hostile takeover defense in China could be constructed as follows: Any new applicant,
regardless of its industry classification, could employ DCSS during its IPO stage with both
Class A and Class B shares carrying one vote per share. Voting rights are conducted according
to units of shares on the one unit, one vote basis, of which each unit could comprise 10 Class B
shares or at least 20 but no more than 100 Class A shares in multiples of ten. Class A shares and
When Class B shares contribute 5% of the total outstanding shares and all these Class B shares are held by the
insiders, provided there is only one Class B share and 19 Class A shares, the voting power of Class B shareholder
is calculated as follows:
1 (Class B share) Xio (votes)
1X10
34.5%. According to a same method of
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Class B shares are issued at the same price, but Class A shares enjoy higher dividends. In a
company with DCSS, Class A shareholders at the general meeting of shareholders enjoy the
right to appoint independent directors exclusively. Class B shares should be no less than 10% of
the total outstanding shares, and are transferable among insiders or their affiliated entities
merely. The retirement of insiders or a change of control event will bring about a mandatory
conversion of Class B shares into Class A shares. CSRC is responsible for checking the
necessity of the application of DCSS on a case-by-case basis and conducting the periodical
evaluation to decide any extension.
V. CONCLUSION
In China, a number of recent amended financial policies and legislation have been
facilitating hostile takeovers hugely through providing abundant leverage capital and
increasing the difficulty of takeover regulation. Therefore, it is a feasible solution to the boom
of hostile takeover via entitling companies to adopt more takeover defenses autonomously, in
particular, DCSS.
The Chinese companies with DCSS listed on the US stock exchanges after 2011 have
achieved a great success in terms of not only financial scale and raised funds, but also stock
return and market capitalization. Such outperformance could provide practical insights that the
adoption of DCSS in China may bring about a similar outcome.
However, the potential risks to companies and shareholders which may be symbiotic
with the adoption of DCSS should not be ignored. Therefore, the core issue lies in seeking a
balance. In case DCSS is adopted, a set of strict restrictions is a feasible way to achieve the
balance. Both the US and Japan permit the adoption of DCSS, and their practices provide some
useful experience which could be transplanted to China with localization, e.g. the restriction on
transfer and the stock unit system. Moreover, CSRC should try its best to avoid misuse of
DCSS through undertaking more responsibilities, e.g. periodical assessment.
In conclusion, it is feasible to adopt DCSS as a hostile takeover defense in China;
however, the application should-be employed with strict restrictions.
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Appendix I: US Listed Chinese Companies with Dual-Class Share Structure From 201163
IPO Raised
Fund
($ USD
Million)

Market
Capitalization
($ USD Million)

19.83

46

390

12.00

10.11

120

702

13.50

14.53

76

793

5/16/2014

22.00

4.13

245

606

5/8/2014

14.00

9.5

168

1,353

17.00

20.11

133

2,279

13.00

16.62

75

696

17.00

45.89

187

6,497

GR

12/11/201
3
11/22/201
3
10/31/201
3
3/23/2012

6.50

11.17

72

7,461

Media

5/12/2011

11.00

3.68

140

262

SCS

5/5/2011

11.50

3.7

89

356

GR

5/4/2011

14.00

1.79

743

609

SCS

3/30/2011

14.50

73.05

176

9,456

NASDAQ
10.00

6.49

110

317

Company &
Symbol

Industry

IPO Date

IPO Price
($ USD)

China Online
Education Group
(COE)
eHi Car Services
Ltd. (EIC)
Zhaopin Ltd.
(ZPIN)
Jumei
International
(JMEI)
Cheetah Mobile
(CMCM)

General
Retailers
(GR)
Travel &
Leisure
Support
Services
GR

6/10/2016

19.00

11/18/201
4
6/12/2014

Software &
Computer
Services
(SCS)
SCS

Last
Sale
(S USD)

NYSE

Autohome Inc.
(ATHM)
500.com (WBAI)
58.com Inc.

SCS
GR

(WUBA)
Vipshop Holdings
Ltd. (VIPS)
Phoenix New
Media Ltd.
(FENG)
NetQin Mobile
Inc. (NQ)
Renren Inc.
(RENN)
Qihoo 360
Technology Co

(QIHU)
Baozun Inc.

Catalog/Specialty

5/21/2

These 24 companies with DCSS are identified via Prospectus and Annual Reports. Data is as of June 30, 2016
unless specified. See generally NASDAQ.com for IPO Date, IPO Price and Last Sale are from DASDAQ;
Industry description, IPO Raised Fund and Market Capitalization are from NASDAQ and NYSE jointly.
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(BZUN)
Momo Inc.
(MOMO)

iDreamSky
Technology Ltd.

Distribution
Computer
Software:
Prepackaged
Software (CSPS)
CSPS

015
12/11/
2014

13.50

10.11

216

1,956

8/7/20
14

15.00

13.63

116

617

Other Specialty
Stores
Transportation
Services

5/22/2
014
5/9/20
14

19.00

21.23

1,780

28,482

9.00

8.43

72

802

Computer
Software:
Programming,
Data Processing
(CSPDP)
Medical/Nursing
Services

4/14/2
014

17.00

28.41

286

5,820

4/9/20
14

14.00

18.34

153

1,212

Other Consumer
Services

4/3/20
14

9.00

10.33

138

573

CSPDP

11/1/2
013

15.00

29.79

167

4,277

EDP Services
1_ _2012
CSPDP

11/21/

10.50

33.87

S(DSKY)
JD.com Inc. (JD)
Tuniu
Corporation
(TOUR)
Weibo
Corporation
(WB)

iKang Healthcare
Group, Inc.
(KANG)
Tarena
International, Inc.
(TEDU)
Qunar Cayman
Islands Ltd.
(QUNR)
YY Inc. (YY)

21 Vianet Group,
4/21/2
Inc. (VNET)
Oil_011
*Figure drawn up by the authors.

82
1

15.00
_

10.21
_

1,874
1

195

847

_

239

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

25

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

Appendix II: Shareholding of the US Listed Chinese Companies with Dual-class Share
Structure From 2011"
Company

Shares Structure

Principle
Shareholders

Class A

Shareholding
Class B

Total
Holding of
Equity
(%)65

Total
Holding of
Voting
Rights
6)

COE

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares: N/A
Class A: N/A
Class B: N/A

Nan Peng Shen

3,947,368

47,032,920

N/A

N/A

Ctrip
Crawford
Tiger Fund
CDH
GS Group
Qiming Group
Ray Ruiping
Zhang
SRS Funds
Ignition Group
SEEK
International
Investments Pty

4,300,000
16,669,726
1,300,000
1,310,326
-

15,168,193
18,694,003
8,599,211
9,081,665
7,673809
8,815432

14.0
13.5
12.0
7.1
6.5
6.5
6.2

19.8
23.7
2.1
11.1
11.5
9.9
10.8

8,334,864
1,153,271
-

6,187,197
68,259,876

6.0
5.3
62.8

1.1
8.0
75.1

7

Date: N/A

EIHC

ZPIN

JMEI

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
138,794,713
Class A: 66,605,209
Class B: 72,189,504
Date: 3/31/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted):
4votes

Ltd

Total
Shares:108,742,056
Class A: 23,815,513
Class B: 84,926,543
Date: 9/30/2015
Class A (listed): 1

Ridgegate
Proprietary Ltd

-

16,666,666

15.3

18.3

Super ROI

-

50,892,198

34.7

75.3

64 Share Structure, Insiders' Shareholding, the amount of Class A Shares, Class B shares and total outstanding
ordinary shares. See SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. Holding of Equity and Holding of Voting rights are
calculated according to the above-mentioned data. Ownership and Insiders' Shareholding is as at date of
company's last annual report or IPO prospectus, whichever is later. Id.
6 Percentage of equity is calculated by dividing the equity of all Class A and Class B common shares as a whole.
6 Percentage of voting power is calculated by dividing the voting power of all Class A and Class B common
shares as a whole.
67 COE was listed on June 10, 2016; no data of its outstanding shares is available currently.
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CMCM

ATHM

vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
146,634,596
Class A: 87,829,756
Class B: 58,804,840
Date: 3/31/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
1,424,588,645
Class A: 369,074,493
Class B:
1,055,514,152
Date: 3/31/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 1
vote per share but
carries right to 51% of
voting rights if
controller holds below
51% but above 39.3%
of total equity of the
company
Total Shares:
113,330,274
Class A: 51,505,946
Class B: 61,824,328

Global Holding
Ltd
Sequoia funds
Xiaoping Xu
Pinnacle
High-Tech Ltd

20,900,000
8,909,079
-

-

7,912,642

14.3
6.1
5.4

3.1
1.3
11.7

11,800,547

662,806,049

47.4

60.8

15,031,120

220,481,928

16.5

20.3

38,867,334

70,581,063

7.7

6.8

Telstra Holdings
Pty Ltd

-

61,824,328

54.6

54.6

67,571,750

-

16.3

6.2

35,042,730

5

8.5

3.2

3,008,830
5,265,010

26,000,006
20,000,008

7.0
6.1

24.3
19.0

Class A (listed): 1
vote

Tsinghua
Unigroup
International Co
Ltd
Sequoia Capital
2010 CGF
Holdco, Ltd
Delite Ltd
Smart Mega
Holdings Ltd
Tencent Holdings
Ltd

50,127,494

14,722,000

22.9

23.2

Class B (unlisted): 10

Nihao China

831,436

28,587,204

10.4

33.6

Kingsoft
Corporation Ltd
Tencent Holdings
Ltd
Sheng Global Ltd

Date: 2/29/2016

WBAI

WUBA

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
413,790,561
Class A: 339,390,262
Class B: 74,400,299
Date: 3/31/2016
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votes
Total Shares:
283,157,733

Corporation
Mark Haoyong
Yang

14,457,571

7,214,653

7.7

10.2

Class A: 219,902,820
Class B: 63,254,913

FMR LLC

18,414,210

-

6.5

2.2

Class A (listed): 1

Elegant Motion

-

16,510,358

14.1

62.1

vote

Holdings Ltd

Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
117,074,312
Class A: 100,563,954
Class B: 16,510,358

Tiger Entities
High Vivacity
Holdings Ltd

9,900,000
8,952,810

-

8.5
7.6

3.7
3.4

Class A (listed): 1

Phoenix Satellite

-

317,325,360

55.6

62.0

vote

Television

13,651,000

-

2.4

2.1

50,352,941

10.5

53.9

270,258,971

135,129,480

39.7

43.0

144,093,852
87,929,871

170,258,970
-

30.8
8.6

49.0
2.3

29,340,466

16.1

41.1

Date: 2/29/2016

VIPS

Date: 3/31/2016

FENG

Class B (unlisted): 1.3

(B.V.I.) Holding

votes

Ltd

Total Shares:
570,651,462
Class A: 253,326,102
Class B: 317,325,360

Shuang Liu

Date: 3/31/2016

NQ

Class A (listed): 1

RPL Holdings Ltd

vote

Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:

480,857,012
Class A: 430,504,041
Class B: 50,352,971
Date: 3/15/2016

RENN

Class A (listed): I

SB Pan Pacific

vote
Class B (unlisted): 10

Corporation and
affiliate

votes
Total Shares:
1,020,682,149
Class A: 715,293,699
Class B: 305,388,450

Joseph Chen
DCM
affiliates

and

Date: 2/29/2016

QIHU

Class A (listed): 1
1 vote

1837288.5

Global Village
Associates Ltd

I

1

_!7
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BZUN

MOMO

Class B (unlisted): 5
votes
Total Shares:
194,160,406
Class A: 152,342,057
Class B: 41,818,349
Date: 2/29/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
148,527,064
Class A: 135,226,326
Class B: 13,300,738
Date: 3/31/2016

Young Vision
Group Ltd

2790780

11,923,346

7.6

17.3

26,469,422

-

17.8

9.9

26,091,863

-

17.6

9.7

20,029,611

-

13.5

7.5

4

9,410,369

6.3

35.1

11,066,989
-

3,890,369

7.5
2.6

4.1
14.5

Class A (listed): 1

Alibaba
Investment Ltd
Crescent Castle
Holdings Ltd
Tsubasa
Corporation
Jesvinco Holdings
Ltd
GS Entities
Casvendino
Holdings Ltd
Gallant Future

-

96,886,370

25.2

77.1

vote

Holdings Ltd

Class B (unlisted): 10

Alibaba

77,749,140

-

20.2

6.2

votes

Investment Ltd

Total Shares:
384,253,289
Class A: 287,366,919
Class B: 96,886,370

Matrix Partners
China II Hong
Kong Ltd

65,970,897

-

17.2

5.3

THL A19 Ltd
Dream Data
Services Ltd
LC Fund entities
Redpoint entities

21,520,490
-

17,520,490
28,873,610

21.5
15.9

21.5
31.6

13,444,610
10,923,550

13,444,610
10,923,550

14.8
12.1

16.2
13.1

Huang River
Investment Ltd
Max Smart Ltd
Hillhouse Capital
Management Ltd
Fortune Rising
Holdings Ltd

498,850,435

-

18.0

4.2

27,937,566
245,217,184

421,507,423
-

16.2
8.9

71.5
2.1

-

55,141,700

2.0

9.3

Date: 3/31/2016

DSKY

JD

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
181,218,545
Class A: 99,772,425
Class B: 81,446,120
Date: 4/18/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 20
votes
Total Shares:
2,767,893,260
Class A:
2,291,244,137
. Class B:
476,649,123
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Date: 2/29/2016
TOUR

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10

BHR Winwood
Investment
Management Ltd

90,909,091

-

24.0

17

votes

78,061,780

-

20.7

14.6

378,089,251
Class A: 360,715,751
Class B: 17,373,500

Affiliates of
JD.com, Inc.
DCM V, L.P. and
Affiliates
Unicorn Riches

34,829,512

-

9.2

6.5

27,436,780

-

7.3

5.1

Date: 3/31/2016

Ltd

Dragon Rabbit

4,104,137

10,423,503

3.8

20.3

Capital Ltd.
Verne Capital Ltd
Sina Corporation

4,104,137
-

6,949,997
116,009,222

2.9
54.5

13.7
78.3

Ali WB
Investment
Holding Ltd

64,883,086

-

30.5

14.6

Date: 3/31/2016
Class A (listed): 1
vote

Top Fortune Win
Ltd

4,448,575

-

13.2

9.9

Class B (unlisted): 15

ShanghaiMed,

3,042,550

-

9.0

6.8

votes
Total Shares:
33,632,240

Inc.
Ora Investment
Pte Ltd

2,003,366

-

6.0

4.5

Class A: 32,827,140

Time Intelligent

526,721

805,100

4.0

28.1

Class B: 805,100
Date: 6/30/2015

Finance Ltd

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10

KKR funds
Learningon Ltd
Goldman Sachs

16,598,480
500,000
5,457,426

7,206,059
6,060,000
-

42.7
11.8
9.8

58.5
40.5
3.6

votes

funds

Total Shares:

Connion Capital

4,413,288

-

7.9

2.9

55,718,419
Class A: 45,143,523

Ltd
Techedu Ltd

2,439,014

1,146,059

6.4

9.2

Total Shares:

Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 3
votes
Total Shares:
212,725,454

WB

Class A: 96,716,232
Class B: 116,009,222
KANG

TEDU6

KANG issued Class C shares as unlisted shares with multiple voting rights; in this form, the author use Class B
in order to keep uniform.
69 See Tarena Technology Group Ltd., ANNUAL REPORTS,
http://ir.tarena.com.cn/phoenix.zhtml?c=253008&p=irol-reportsannual (last visited May 21, 2017). According to
the annual report of TEDU filed on April 20, 2016, the total issued Class B shares as of March 31, 2016 was
10,574,896. However, the same filing states that the principle shareholders held a combined amount of Class B
shares of 17,780,955. Therefore, the data disclosed by TEDU is self-contradict and inaccurate.
68
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QUNR

YY

Class B: 10,574,896

IDG funds

-

3,368,837

6.0

22.3

Date: 3/31/3016
Class A (unlisted): 3
vote

Ctrip.com
International, Ltd

-

190,152,519

43.8

42.3

Class B (listed): 1

M Strat Holdings

-

85,748,724

19.7

19.1

votes

GP, Ltd

-

25,568,241

5.9

5.7

-

24,621,642

5.7

5.5

-

192,741,483

17.5

43.6

Total Shares:

Viking Global

434,347,172
Class A: 7,345,925
Class B: 427,001,247
Date: 3/31/3016
Class A (listed): 1
vote

Investors LP
Momentum
Strategic Holdings
GP, Ltd
Top Brand
Holdings Ltd

Class B (unlisted): 10

YYME Ltd

16,000,000

175,241,483

17.4

40.0

Fast Horse
Technology Ltd
Sunrise Corporate
Holding Ltd
King Venture
Holdings Ltd
Esta Investments
Pte Ltd
Xiaomi Ventures

-

19,670,117

3.8

17.9

6,700,000

12,187,875

3.6

11.7

39,087,125

18,250,268

10.9

20.2

64,668,024

-

votes
Total Shares:
1,098,859,244

Class A: 729,301,268
Class B: 369,557,976
VNET

Date: 3/31/3016
Class A (listed): 1
vote
Class B (unlisted): 10
votes
Total Shares:
524,207,918
Class A: 460,611,670
Class B: 63,596,248
Date: 3/31/3016 -

Ltd
The OZ Funds
*Figure drawn up by the authors.

12.3
I

_

5.9
I

6,142,410

10,524,257

3.2

10.2

29,555,580

-

5.6

2.7
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Appendix III: US Listed Chinese Companies with Staggered Board Structure from
201170
Industr
y

IPO
Date

Market
Capitalization
($ USD Million)
NASDAQ

Directors
Classes

Term of Office
Election

China
Customer
Relations
Centers, Inc.
(CCRC)

Business
Services

12/21/2
015

200

Pacific
Special
Acquisition
Corp
(PAAC)

Business
Services

10/15/2
015

78

Class A: 1
Director
Class B: 2
Directors
Class C: 4
Directors
Class A: 3
Directors
Class B: 2
Directors

E-compass
Acquisition
Corp
(ECAC)

Business
Services

8/13/20
15

54

Wowo Ltd
(JMU)

EDP
Services

4/8/201
5

303

Tantech

Major

3/24/20

92

3 Years
The term of office of
each class expires
alternately, and only one
class to be elected each
year.
2 Years
The term of office of
each class expires
alternately, and only one
class to be elected each
year.
3 Years
The term of office of
each class expires
alternately, and only one
class to be elected each
year.
The term of office of
each class expires
alternately, and only one
class to be elected each
year.
Then, one third of the
directors (or, if their
number is not a multiple
of three, the number
nearest to but not greater
than one third) will
retire from office and
stand for election every
year at annual general
meeting of shareholders.
3 Years

Class A: 1
Director
Class B: 2
Directors
Class C: 2
Directors
Class A: 3
Directors
Class B: 2
Directors
Class C: 4
Directors

5 Directors in

&

Company &
Symbol

Data is as of June 30, 2016 unless specified. See generally NASDAQ.com. Industry description and Market
Capitalization are from NYSE and NASDAQ jointly; Director Classes, Term of office and Election. See SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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Holdings Ltd
(TANH)

Chemica
Is

15

total
Class A: N/A
Class B: N/A
Class C: N/A

The term of office of
each class expires
alternately, and only one
class to be elected each
year.

*Figure drawn up by the authors.

Appendix IV: Restrictions on Dual-Class Share Structure on the American Stock
Exchangesn
Characteristic

Description of Restriction

Adoption by
Chinese Companies

Restriction on
the transfer to
outsiders

Multiple voting shares must be converted into
OSOV shares at the same amount if the holder
of multiple voting shares transfer them to any
person or entity who is not an affiliate of such
holder
One company (JD) requires the conversion of
all its Class B shares into Class A shares in case
that the founder retires from the position of
CEO or cannot attend board meeting due to
physical or mental condition permanently
One company (ATHM) requires the conversion
of all its Class B shares into Class A shares in
case of a change of control
A restriction for the conversion of all multiple
voting shares into OSOV shares if their holders
approve

All the 24
companies

RetirementlInc
apacity/death
of founder

Change of
control
Vote to exit

Threshold of
the percentage

Threshold of
minimum
equity held by
insiders

One company (EHIC) requires all its Class B
shares with multiple voting rights to be
converted into Class A shares if the amount of
Class B shares falls below 5% of its total equity
Five companies (JMEI, WUBA, NQ, WB, YY)
require that if the co-founders and their
affiliates collectively hold less than 5% of the
total issued Class B Shares, all Class B shares

Examples of Adoption
by American
Companies
Alphabet
Facebook
LinkedIn

One of the 24
companies (JD)

Google
LinkedIn
Groupon

One of the 24
companies
(ATHM)
None

None

One of the 24
companies (EHIC)

Facebook (the approval
of simply majority of
multiple voting
shareholders)
Groupon (the approval
of at least 66.6% of
multiple voting
shareholders)
LinkedIn (the threshold
of conversion is 10%)

11 of the 24
companies (JMEI,
ATHM,WUBA,
VIPS, NQ, RENN,

AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc.
(30% of all outstanding
shares threshold)

71 See generally SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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Sunset clause

must be converted into Class A share; ATHM
sets this threshold at 39.3%;
VIPS sets its threshold in terms of an amount of
5,651,402 Class B shares rather than by
percentage;
The conversion in JD will be triggered in case
its founder does not hold any Class B share;
KANG sets its threshold at 8% of the total
outstanding shares;
RENN requires that if at any time the
co-founders and their affiliates collectively
hold less than 50% of the issued Class B
Shares, their Class B shares rather than all the
Class B shares must be converted into Class A
share.
A restriction for the conversion of all multiple
voting shares into OSOV shares after a specific
term.

JD, WB, KANG,
YY)

None

Groupon (conversion
into ordinary shares
after 5 years)

*Figure drawn up by the authors.
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